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October 4, 2003, Scotsman BOTH SIDES TRY TO CLAIM WMD VICTORY Gethin Chamberlain Diplomatic Correspondent FOR George Bush and Tony Blair, the interim report of the Iraq Study Group was proof positive that they were right to invade Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein from being able to use weapons of mass destruction. For many other people, it was the evidence they had been waiting for that the war against Iraq had been an unjustified breach of international law. No sooner had the CIA's man, Dr David Kay, delivered his report to the US Congress on Thursday night than the arguments started. The problem was that while he had not found any weapons, or even traces of weapons, his team had found plenty to suggest that it was not for want of trying on Saddam's part. The US president, George Bush, appeared clear in his own mind about what the report proved. Saddam Hussein had deceived the international community and was "a danger to the world", he said. "He's no longer in power and the world is better for it." Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, also was adamant, although he struggled to get his point across. The fact that the 1,200-strong team had not found any weapons obviously did not mean weapons were not there, he said. According to Mr Straw, Dr Kay's report suggested that chemical weaponry material was "almost certainly" hidden in 130 separate armament supply positions, of which he had been able to inspect a mere ten. "There is no doubt from all the evidence that they did indeed pose a current and serious threat," he said. While the report did not provide evidence of weapons, it did make it clear Saddam Hussein was failing to abide by UN resolutions. There was evidence of WMD-related activity and significant amounts of equipment hidden from the UN, while a vial of the botulinum poison was discovered in the home of one weapons scientist. Although there was no evidence to suggest there was a nuclear programme, there was plenty to suggest Saddam would have liked to acquire such weapons. "The testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons," Dr Kay said. According to Dr Kay, Saddam's regime was actively developing missiles that exceeded range limits imposed by the United Nations. The allegation Saddam had revived his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes after UN inspectors left Iraq in December 1998 was the main justification for the US-led war to disarm Iraq. Opponents of the war and independent bodies seized on the results as evidence of a failure on the part of the coalition to make the case for war. The International Atomic Energy Agency suggested Dr Kay's report was largely based on "statements and opinions by scientists and officials, with no apparent supporting evidence". But what was clear even from the coverage of the publication of the report was that how the report was read depended on the sympathies of the reader. Whatever the merits of the report, it left the British government once more on the back foot. Jack Straw, sent in to bat for the government, struggled to make any impact. Instead of arguing Saddam was a dictator who oppressed his people, tortured them and ruled by fear, whose Baath Party controlled access to education, health care and even the rations on which the population subsisted, he became bogged down, asserting the coalition had no choice but to go to war because they had assembled an army for that purpose. "If we had not taken military action at the time as we did, in the face of that defiance then the resolve of the international community would have died down, and then inspectors would have found it more and more difficult to do their work as they had done before," he complained. "Then they would have been kicked out. We would have had a Saddam Hussein still there, re-empowered and re-emboldened and able to continue to develop these programmes in a more dangerous form, to continue to disrupt the region and threaten international peace and security and to continue his reign of terror on his own people." Just as Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, squirmed and changed his stance during the Hutton inquiry, Mr Straw appears to be doing the same when faced with the absence of evidence of WMD. Instead of standing firm and defending the decision to go to war, he is trying to move the goalposts. But it is not clear why he should want to do so. The interim report did not prove conclusively Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction, it simply reported that it had failed to find them. It has also failed to find Saddam Hussein. It also failed to find, until August, an entire Iraqi fighter squadron buried in the sands of northern Iraq. Those that will oppose the government whatever the evidence were quick to seize on the report as proof of their case. But others are prepared to wait, uncertain of what may yet be found in a country as large and unpredictable as Iraq. Michael Ancram, the shadow foreign secretary, put it best: "We don't know whether they are there or not," he said.
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................................................................................................................. Copyright ©2004 Gethin Chamberlain. All rights reserved. |
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