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23-07-2005 The Scotsman

Waging war as a world terrorist franchise

By Gethin Chamberlain

THERE was no queue at the Lancaster Gate Tube station this morning. Normally, the crowd spills out onto the street, but not today. I thought I might have overslept, maybe missed a day, but no, it was still Friday morning, middle of the rush hour. Business as usual, the Metropolitan Police commissioner called it.

The policeman standing outside the station looked bored, and that at least was rather encouraging. Sir Ian Blair, the Met commissioner, might do well to adopt that as official policy. It couldn't be any less useful than the rest of his policies, which appear to be based on an unshakeable belief that he knows what he is doing, and an equal certainty that he will eventually get to slap the cuffs on one Mr O B Laden and tell him: "Come along now sonny, you're nicked."

That's the odd thing about these attacks. There has been a distinct lack of "official" al-Qaeda gloating, fuzzy videos glorifying the deeds of the perpetrators and promising more planes of death, cars of death or some other death-related transport.

There was the claim of responsibility by a group with a name so long and convoluted that it could have come straight out of a Monty Python film, but bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have been notably quiet.

Now it is possible they will pop up between me typing these words and the moment you read them, but I wouldn't put too much credence on what they say. I no longer believe that Santa Claus brings me Christmas presents and I'm not so sure that Osama bin Laden and his little elves personally deliver every bomb attack.

In this, I am clearly at odds with Sir Ian, the British intelligence services and the government, whose determination to prove that the London bomb attacks of the past couple of weeks are the work of bin Laden smacks almost of desperation.

No sooner had the first bombs gone off than Sir Ian and Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, popped up to announce that the bombings had all the hallmarks of al-Qaeda. The mantra has been repeated again and again. Faced with a threat of aggression, they have geared themselves up to do what people in their situation almost always do: fight the last war.

Never mind that the last "real" al-Qaeda co-ordinated attack was on 11 September, 2001 in the United States: Sir Ian and co are sure that they will find a trail of evidence leading them back to the mouth of bin Laden's cave. The reason for this desperation is simple. They at least know something about al-Qaeda now, and the intelligence services have an idea about what they are looking for. But it is becoming clear that they would do well to think again.

Al-Qaeda, as we knew it - and by that I mean in the sense of a core body of hardened Arab mujahideen commanded by bin Laden - has been going through something of a difficult period. Battered almost to death in Afghanistan, they have scattered, some sloping off across the border into Pakistan, some attempting to find refuge in Iran and some going back into action in Iraq.

Prior to 9/11, they were a well-organised unit, capable of raising and channelling large amounts of cash and able to put together a spectacular attack. That is not the case now. What has happened instead is rather akin to what happens when a tree is coppiced: the main stem is cut down and a number of new stems shoot up.

If al-Qaeda exists at all now, it is as a sort of global franchise, a McDonald's for militant Muslims. It is not a group, more of an idea. The Spanish attacks were mounted by north Africans and those in London were home grown, with, it seems, a little help along the way from some groups in Pakistan.

There are a number of militant groups in Pakistan which have moved into the vacuum left by al-Qaeda. There is Jaish-e-Mohammad, already linked strongly to the first suicide gang, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which also appears to have helped them along. The latter has been co-ordinating the activities of something called the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People since al-Qaeda handed over the reins in 2003.

They recruit and raise cash in the West and are thought to maintain sleeper cells here. The madrassas in Pakistan act as a fertile breeding ground for new jihadists. The bombers clearly talked these attacks through with someone with experience, probably in Pakistan. However, once they returned to Britain there is no reason they could not have planned and carried out the attacks themselves. They were all intelligent young men and it is patronising to say that they could not have done it.

It is time to think differently, but it appears our security services had not considered this a realistic threat. Their own assessment of the threat level before the first attacks was that there was no group in the UK with the intent or capability to mount an attack.

They knew there was a "wide range of extremist networks and individuals in the UK and individuals and groups that are inspired by but only loosely affiliated to AQ or are entirely autonomous". Some of them had the potential to attack, they concluded, but they were not ready yet.

The question has to be asked: how did they fail to pick up on such a well-planned attack, involving at least one man who had already come to their attention? Were they simply looking in the wrong place?

It would hardly be surprising to discover that they were not looking at radicalised British Muslims when the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Brian Paddick, used the first press conference to say: "The first thing I would say is that, as far as I'm concerned, 'Islamic' and 'terrorism' are two words that do not go together."

He went on: "There may be people who present themselves as Muslims who carry out these acts but it is totally against what I understand to be the Islamic faith and what Muslims generally stand for."

He was keeping an open mind, he said. Sir Ian was at it again after Thursday's attacks: it was not Muslims who were behind the attack, but criminals.

The Met is still trying to get over its tag of "institutional racism" and its caution must be viewed through that filter. But it makes little sense to insist that there is no link between radical Muslims and terrorism. The people behind these attacks have an ideology, and it is based on their extreme interpretation of their religion. They are opposed to the West and are looking to create a new caliphate. They, not the West, are the new crusaders.

Time and again we hear from the Galloways and the Shorts that Iraq is to blame for what has been visited on us. And it is undoubtedly true that it has given the extremists something else to get upset about - but they were already angry.

It is foolish to apply our own values to these people. Saying that you understand their anger does not stop them targeting you. Suicide attacks on civilians are unacceptable in the society in which we and they live. If collateral bombing of civilians in Iraq is wrong it is wrong in London too.

These people are driven by a religious fervour, not by a sense of annoyance over world events. Of course there are many Muslim youths who are furious about what is happening in Iraq and before that they were furious about Afghanistan and before that Palestine and, well, the list goes on. But they don't all blow themselves up.

This is not about our actions: we are looking at it the wrong way round. It's a clash of ideologies and religions. It is a war.

Iraq and Afghanistan were our victories and 9/11 and London and the insurgency in Iraq our setbacks. The bombers have chosen their side. Blair, Paddick and the rest are going to have to accept this and act on it.

After all, the young men who perpetrated the attacks of the last couple of weeks are getting their religious guidance from the same people who brought us the Taleban. If we did everything they wanted, pulled out of Iraq, allowed their terrorist states to operate, they would still want more.

 

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Copyright ©2004 Gethin Chamberlain. All rights reserved.