News Search Search this site or the web powered by FreeFind Site search Web search Story archive		15-8-2003 Scotsman The Hutton Inquiry: As the truth emerges, net closes on Blair and Hoon By Gethin Chamberlain Defence Correspondent UNTIL yesterday, it was still unclear why Dr David Kelly, a man apparently looking forward to returning to the job he loved best - hunting weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - should suddenly decide to take his own life. Yesterday, for the first time since the Hutton inquiry began, answers started to emerge, tightening the noose around the neck of Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence. Bryan Wells, the expert's immediate superior, described Dr Kelly as "the fount of all knowledge" on the work of UN weapons inspectors. He was an important figure in the MoD who could brief all the way up the chain, vital in knowing which individuals would be able to help seek out Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But although Dr Kelly seemed happy in his work, he was not happy with the way he had been treated by his employers. He had written to complain about his pay and the rewards for his efforts and was left embarrassed and uneasy by an incident in which he had been deported from Kuwait due to a visa mix-up involving the MoD. Although Dr Kelly finally made it to Iraq in early June, the knives were already out. Martin Howard, the MoD's deputy chief of defence intelligence, wrote to Mr Wells to say he suspected Dr Kelly might be the source of a newspaper story about mobile weapons laboratories. Dr Kelly denied he was the source. But Mr Howard was not satisfied. He wanted to speak to Dr Kelly and it was decided to bring him in to find out what he had been saying to journalists. The meeting was postponed, but only because it was thought Dr Kelly may have been involved in the leaking of a top secret document - about the absence of links between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein - to Andrew Gilligan, whose claim that the government "sexed-up" its dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction so angered No 10. The leak of the document was the subject of a police investigation and although Dr Kelly was subsequently ruled out of that inquiry, he remained in the spotlight. Mr Wells saw Mr Gilligan's evidence to the Commons foreign affairs committee about the weapons (WMD) story, and wanted to know more about Dr Kelly's dealings with the BBC reporter. "I most certainly have never attempted to undermine the government in any way," Dr Kelly wrote back. He was sympathetic to the war because he recognised from a decade's work the menace Iraq posed: "I have never acted as a conduit to release or leak information. I have never discussed classified information with anyone other than those cleared so to do. I do not feel deep unease over the dossier." Mr Wells said he decided he should speak to Dr Kelly about the letter, but others had also been taking an interest. The matter was taken out of his hands. A decision was taken, he said, that Richard Hatfield, head of personnel at the MoD, should carry out the interview due to the seriousness with which the letter was being taken. Why had the switch been made? Evidence from Mr Howard shed light on the decision. Sir Kevin Tebbit, permanent secretary at the MoD, had spoken to Mr Howard and made it clear he thought it would be better if it was the personnel director who led the interview. The meeting on Friday, 4 July, at which Mr Wells was also present, lasted an hour and three quarters without a break. Dr Kelly was told it would determine whether there was evidence to warrant formal disciplinary action and to establish whether he was the source of Mr Gilligan's story. Dr Kelly was told the meeting could turn out to be very important in relation to the public dispute between the government and the BBC, a statement might have to be issued based on his account and he might be identified. Dr Kelly stood by his account. But Mr Hatfield told Dr Kelly he thought his contact with Mr Gilligan had been "particularly ill-judged". In his note of the meeting, he said: "I would however write to him shortly to record my displeasure at his conduct and told him to familiarise himself with departmental guidelines and finally I warned Dr Kelly that the possibility of disciplinary action could of course be reopened if further facts came to light that called his account into question." How, Mr Wells was asked, did Dr Kelly react while "this version of the riot act was being read to him?" He looked uncomfortable, said Mr Wells, but he was expecting it. The inquiry was told the night before the meeting, the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, had contacted Jonathan Powell, the Chief of Staff at Downing Street. No explanation was given for the call. The following Monday, Mr Hatfield rang Mr Wells. He had been asked to speak to Dr Kelly again, as soon as possible. Mr Wells rang Dr Kelly, who was attending a training course for his trip to Iraq, and told him to return to London immediately. Mr Wells was unable to offer an explanation for the meeting. But Mr Howard could. The reason for the second meeting had been high-level calls preceding the second interview, he said. "Sir Kevin wrote a letter to Sir David Omand (the Cabinet Office intelligence and security co-ordinator)... I understand that there were quite a lot of high level discussions on the telephone between Sir David, Sir Kevin and possibly others," he said. A memo from Sir David to Sir Kevin "recorded the Prime Minister's view that before we decided on what next step should be taken, it would be sensible to try and go into a bit more detail into the differences between what Dr Kelly said and what Mr Gilligan had claimed". Others were keen to make sure Dr Kelly did not get off the hook. John Scarlett, the chairman of the joint intelligence committee, wrote to Sir David suggesting they take a tough line. It looked increasingly likely Dr Kelly was Mr Gilligan's source, he said. "If this is true, Kelly is not telling the whole story." And he added: "I suggest a proper, security-style interview in which all these inconsistencies are thrashed out. Another memo, from Dominic Wilson, private secretary to Sir Kevin, his boss: "What is now needed is a more intensive interview with Kelly." The meeting went ahead, at 4pm on 7 July. Four men were present; Dr Kelly, Mr Wells, Mr Hatfield and Mr Howard. Dr Kelly was told it was likely a public statement would need to be made about the Gilligan row. As MoD personnel director, Mr Hatfield handed Dr Kelly a draft press release which the weapons expert read. Was it a security-style interview? "I don't know what a security-style interview is but it does not sound very nice," Mr Wells said. The meeting, he added, was actually very friendly. But the letter Dr Kelly received from Mr Hatfield afterwards was not. His contact with Mr Gilligan was ill-judged, he said: "Your discussion with him in May has also had awkward consequences for both yourself and the department." His conduct fell well short of the standards expected of a civil servant of his standing and "further breaches would almost certainly result in disciplinary action with potentially serious consequences". It went on: "I should also remind you that the possibility of disciplinary action could be reopened if any facts were to come to light which appear to call into question the account and the assurance that you gave to me." When Dr Kelly's name was finally released to the media, he went into hiding. But in the meantime, the House of Commons' intelligence and security committee, which sits in private, and the foreign affairs committee, which sits in public, wanted to speak to him. Sir Kevin sent a memo to Mr Hoon urging him not to subject Dr Kelly to public inquisition. It would attach "disproportionate importance" to his evidence. But he added: "The other reason for avoiding two hearings is some regard for the man himself. The man came forward voluntarily. He is not on trial." Mr Hoon disagreed. A memo from his private office said: "Presentationally, it would be difficult to defend a position in which the government had objected to Dr Kelly appearing before a committee of the House which takes evidence in public in favour of an appointed committee which meets in private." Mr Wells said he spoke to Dr Kelly after it was decided he should appear before both committees. "He appeared tired, but fine," he said. But some people were nervous about what he would say and Dr Kelly was called to a meeting with Mr Wells and Mr Howard. They ran through questions he might be asked, ending with, a note of the meeting showed, "tricky areas" - areas the committee might probe but which were at the limits of what Mr Hoon wanted covered. These included "views on Iraqi WMD programmes, the government's handling of the affair and whether he was Gilligan's source". Were they attempting to point him in the direction of a suggested line? No, said Mr Wells. The inquiry then heard of a memo from Colin Smith, of the MoD's counter proliferation department, which said Mr Howard was to brief Dr Kelly and "will strongly recommend that Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the dossier but stuck to what he told Gilligan". The memo added: "Kelly is apparently feeling the pressure and does not appear to be handing it well." Mr Howard, though, stuck to his guns. Asked if Dr Kelly as being given a "certain steer" he replied: "Certainly not". So Dr Kelly went before the committees. "He was clearly very nervous" said Patrick Lamb, deputy head of the counter proliferation department at the Foreign Office. He knew Dr Kelly was feeling the strain, he said, because a colleague told him that "David was under stress". But he said once Dr Kelly had received his warning letter from Mr Hatfield, he had been able to reassure him that the worst was over. "You've got nothing else to fear," he told him.
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